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Introduction

American accounting standards had long been considered the benchmark to
which most other international standard‐setting bodies compared. This influence in
the international accounting realm largely rested on the strength of the United
States capital markets, among other things. Yet, lately many academics,
professionals, and auditors have voiced various concerns about US accounting
standards and their ability to generate reliable financial information. Still, the
predominant sentiment in America was to just continue ‘business as usual’. Faced
with the challenges of an ever evolving and increasingly globalized business world,
US accounting standard‐setters considered the value of international standard
adoption. Though they had engaged in conversations with international standard‐
setters and initiated several joint ventures1, their efforts have been largely
unsuccessful. Unbeknownst to the accounting community, one of the largest ever
corporate insolvencies was looming on the horizon. Enron, a Texas‐based energy,
commodities, and services company, had been named ‘America’s Most Innovative
Company’ by Fortune Magazine for six consecutive years (Q&A: The Enron case,
2006). By late 2001, it was revealed that Enron’s success had been largely sustained
by taking advantage of creative accounting techniques. On December 2nd, 2001,

1 Accounting for revenue recognition is an example of one of these efforts. In the United States, for
example, there are over one hundred different ways to account for revenue. In countries abroad that
elect to use IFRS, the international set of standards, revenue recognition is largely determined by one
basic standard, IAS 18. As such, the American and international standard‐setting bodies have
attempted to work together towards convergence with the intention of increasing global
comparability (Howard, n.d.).
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Enron filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection under Title 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (Oppel and Sorkin, 2001). Once the dust had settled, questions
immediately began to surface. People wondered how Enron had been able to exploit
loopholes and perpetuate this fraudulent accounting treatment for so long. It was
evident that Enron had gone to great lengths to conceal the truth regarding its
earnings, “and its cooperative auditors failed to insist that it follow the rules on
related party transactions” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1042). So were Enron’s opportunistic
managers to blame? Or was it the company’s ‘independent’ auditors, Arthur
Anderson? Still many pointed to the progressively more complex accounting
standards. The answers to these questions will be more fully explored later, but one
could argue that, to some extent, all three, the management, auditors, and standards,
played a role in propagating the fraud.
Enron and Arthur Anderson, one of the largest accounting firms in the
world2, were both dissolved within a matter of years. Enron ended its bankruptcy in
2004 and sold its final remaining entity in September 2006 (The rise and fall of
Enron: A brief history, 2006). Doomed to a similar fate, Arthur Anderson voluntarily
forfeited its licenses to practice accountancy in the United States in 2002 following a
guilty verdict in relation to the firm’s handling of the Enron audit (Beltran, Gering,
and Martin, 2002). The more long‐lasting impact, however, was the calling‐to‐
question of the once seemingly infallible US accounting standards. Often crises can
serve as an impetus for institutional change. Investors, both domestic and

Arthur Anderson was, at the time, one of the ‘Big 5’ accounting firms. The other four were, and are
still to this day: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG.
2
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international, began to lose confidence in the merit of US financial reporting. More
explicitly, one author cites the American accounting scandals of 2001‐2002 as one of
the most essential drivers responsible for igniting “accounting standard
harmonization3 by breaking a deadlock between the US accounting authorities and
the IASB4” (Eaton, 2005, p. 1).
Many, at both the individual and institutional levels, began to question why,
during a historically deregulatory period in the United States, accounting standards
were becoming more and more complex (Sawabe, 2005). Though perhaps an over‐
attribution, many point to the highly technical yet flawed accounting rules as the
main culprit in the Enron scandal. They argue that had the accounting rules been
better, the fraud may have been avoided. Regardless of the validity of this argument,
US standards had grown increasingly precise over time, characterized by detailed
guidance and numerous exemptions. Many felt that this precision not only invited,
but encouraged, opportunistic interpretation of accounting standards by corporate
management (Agoglia, Doupnik, and Tsakumis, 2011). More and more, managers
began developing a ‘Where does it say I can’t do this?’ mentality. Creative managers
gradually started to “exploit the gaps in GAAP5” (Anson, 2002). That is, these
managers structured transactions in such a way that they would technically be in
compliance with the standard but would ultimately fail to communicate the

3 Accounting standard harmonization refers to the reduction in variation between the different
bodies of standards used internationally.
4 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB): board responsible for issuing international
accounting standards in over 115 countries, including all companies listed in Europe.
5 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
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economic reality, a practice known as regulatory arbitrage6. During the ‘Dot‐Com
Bubble7’, the number of inappropriately structured transactions grew and
eventually led to massive overstatements and subsequent restatements. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO)8 issued a report in October 2002 noting
that restatements by public companies increased from ninety‐two in 1997 to two
hundred twenty‐five in 2001. Between January 1997 and June 2002, eight hundred
forty‐five companies had announced restatements, nearly ten percent of all those
publicly traded. So again, why this move towards more rules in accounting
standards?
This movement was driven primarily by two factors: the United States legal
environment and demand from managers and auditors, a related but separate topic.
There seems to be a propensity towards rules in the US legal system. The existence
of rules allows for actors to hide behind so‐called ‘bright lines’. A bright‐line rule is
objective and clearly defined, allowing for little or no interpretation. In the United
States’ health care system, for example, practitioners are forced to issue numerous,
and often unnecessary, tests in order to avoid potential malpractice lawsuits. In a
similar vein, managers and auditors prefer rules because they can point to
adherence of a certain rule in court as a means to absolve themselves of any

6 Regulatory arbitrage: “the practice of structuring an inappropriate transaction so it stays within the
bounds set by a rule” (Bratton, 2003).
7 The Dot‐Com Bubble refers to a period from approximately 1997‐2000 during which speculative
investors experienced huge stock price increases in the internet sector before they peaked in March,
2000, followed by a quick, steep decline in price (Here’s why the Dot Com bubble began and why it
popped, 2010).
8 The GAO is “an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress, supporting them in
meeting their constitutional responsibilities and ensuring the accountability of the federal
government” (Herrick and Barrionuevo, 2002).
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wrongdoing. Of course, this propensity towards rules often does not align with
investors desires for timely, relevant, and reliable information, much like
unnecessary tests do not align with patients desires for a reasonable hospital bill.
In response to the accounting scandals of 2001‐2002, Congress was forced to
step in and act. On July 26, 2002, after a 99‐0 vote in the Senate and a 423‐3 vote in
the House, Congress presented the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 to President George
W. Bush. On July 30, the president signed the Act into law, marking the most
significant piece of securities legislation since the Great Depression. Some of the key
provisions of the Act include: the establishment of a five‐member accounting
oversight board, increased ban on consulting activities for audit clients, audit
partner rotation9, required communication with the audit committee, and a study on
the value of principles‐based accounting. Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)10 conducted this study and issued a
report on their findings. There was a growing about accounting standards in the
United States, and many pointed to the high level of rules and guidance as the
primary issue with GAAP. Assessing the value of a more ‘principles‐oriented’
approach over the more ‘rules‐oriented’ approach, the SEC reported that the US
standard‐setting body would be “moving forward with a more principles‐based
approach…as a means of increasing the quality of financial reporting and restoring

9 Audit partners responsible for reviewing the audit of a particular client must be rotated every five
consecutive years (The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002, n.d.)
10 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): In response to the Great Depression, Congress enacted
into law the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, creating the SEC. The SEC was tasked, among other
duties, with helping to develop and standardize the financial information presented to stockholders
and investors. The SEC, a federal agency, delegates its role of developing standards to the
independent, private FASB.
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trust in the current financial reporting system” (Bailey and Sawers, 2012, p. 41).
That said, the SEC study does acknowledge that no regime can preclude fraud
entirely. Malevolent actors will always find ways in which to behave dishonestly, no
matter how well the rule or standard be been constructed. Still, the SEC study
argues for a reconceptualization of US accounting standards, one in which managers
and auditors are held accountable primarily to the principles behind the standards
and secondarily to the detailed implementation guidance, or rules.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows. The next section
provides a description of the accounting conceptual framework and briefly
describes the parties involved in the standard‐setting process. The following two
sections further discuss the United States legal environment and how incentives of
managers and auditors are not always aligned with those of investors. The next
section briefly describes both the rules‐oriented and principles‐oriented approach
to accounting standard‐setting, discusses in more detail the findings of the SEC
study (mentioned above), and investigates the ‘rules versus principles’ debate. The
following section examines the effects of standard type on litigation incidences and
outcomes, and the final section includes concluding remarks regarding standard
implementation.

10

Conceptual Framework, the FASB, and GAAP
asdfadfasdfasdasdfasdf
In order to engage in an informed ‘rules versus principles’ debate, one must
first obtain a fundamental understanding of the conceptual framework. The
framework establishes the underlying principles behind accounting standards. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a full‐time, well‐paid, independent
standard‐setting body, responsible for generating the conceptual framework and
defining its objectives. Shortly after the board was created in 1973, they developed a
theoretical structure that would help define and resolve financial reporting issues.
The FASB, comprised of seven members from the accounting profession, the
corporate world, and academia, is supported by the SEC to work towards its mission
to “establish and improve standards and financial reporting for the guidance and
education of the public, which includes issuers, auditors, and users of financial
information” (Facts about FASB, n.d.). Armed with the support of the SEC, the FASB
established the primary objective of the conceptual framework: decision usefulness
for financial statement users. Financial statement preparers should strive to create
relevant and reliable information, which ultimately enhances comparability
between firms. Each of these supporting pieces contributes to decision usefulness in
a unique way, and these characteristics can even be in conflict, at times.
The level of relevance a piece of financial information is said to possess is
determined by the extent to which it makes a difference in the decision formulating
process. Relevance itself is determined by three main components: predictive value,
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confirmatory value, and materiality. The first component, predictive value,
measures how valuable a piece of information is in the prediction formulation
process. Predictive value enhances investors’ ability to forecast the future amount
and timing of cash that will be received and paid by a company. Since financial
information is reported after the fact, the next component, confirmatory value,
confirms the extent to which past predictions were correct. Materiality, the final and
arguably most important component of relevance, describes information that, if
incorrect or omitted entirely, would influence investors’ decisions. For example,
recording the sale of an iPhone case twice (also known as double‐booking) would
not likely have a material impact on an investor’s decision whereas recording the
sale of an iPhone twice would likely materially impact that decision. Though this is a
simple, straight‐forward example, it helps illustrate the importance of materiality.
Another facet of decision usefulness is reliability. The concept of reliability
asserts that the accounting numbers and descriptions match economic reality.
Similar to relevance, reliability emphasizes the importance of faithfully represented
information. That is, financial information should reflect the economic substance of
a transaction. The primary characteristics that increase reliability are:
completeness, neutrality, and absence of error. Completeness assumes that no
information has been withheld from investors and all material information has been
disclosed. Neutrality refers to the desirability for unbiased information. The final
aspect, absence of error, does not imply total freedom from error, but rather a
reasonable assurance that the information has been presented faithfully. Since
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financial statement users do not have the time or adequate resources to evaluate the
factuality of content, they are largely forced to depend on the reliability assumption.
If relevance and reliability are said to be in the same family, then
comparability and consistency are in the rival family. An important aspect of
decision usefulness revolves around investors’ ability to compare financial
information, both between firms and industries and over time. Comparability is
achieved when firms account for similar transactions uniformly in financial
reporting (Sawabe, 2005). Consistency asserts that transactions will be accounted
for uniformly over time. That is, once a certain accounting treatment is adopted, it
will be followed consistently between accounting periods, and if a change were to
occur, full disclosure as to why must be stated. Between the two sets of concepts,
comparability and consistency and relevance and reliability, an inherent trade‐off
exists. Tessema asserts, “In the US the call for comparability has, amongst other
things, led to what may be called an excessive overregulation” (Tessema, 2012, p. 5).
Still, many have called for an even greater emphasis on comparability because, as
the standards exist currently, a single economic phenomenon can be faithfully
represented in multiple ways. As a result, accounting standards are surrounded by
a cloud of public skepticism (Tessema, 2012). Deciding which way to tip the scale
regarding this inherent trade‐off is no trivial task. Even within similar industries,
organizations are very complex and their operations may differ substantially. By
placing more emphasis on providing information that reliably depicts the economic
reality of each individual organization, comparability must suffer at the hands of
relevance.
13

This trade‐off is of particular interest to the FASB. As the body responsible
for setting United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), the
FASB is tasked with the difficult challenge of creating and implementing a generally
accepted and universally practiced set of accounting standards. Founded in 1887,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the national
professional organization of practicing CPAs, acting as a key contributor to the
development of GAAP11. However, before the formation of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, there was no universal body of accounting standards in the
United States. At the request of the SEC, the AICPA appointed the Committee on
Accounting Procedure (CAP) in 1939. Between their inception and 1959, the CAP
issued fifty‐one Accounting Research Bulletins that dealt with a variety of
accounting problems. Serving in a largely reactive capacity, though, the CAP failed to
establish a structured body of accounting principles. In response, the AICPA created
the Accounting Principles Board (APB) in 1959. The APB issued 31 APB Opinions
between 1959 and 1973, but, again, the APB ultimately failed to develop an overall
conceptual framework that could assist in the resolution of problems as they
surfaced. The FASB, created in 1973, is the body currently responsible for setting
accounting standards in the United States. US GAAP is their response to the difficult
task of creating a unified set of accounting standards that are not only based on a
structured body of principles, but can also adapt to the ever‐changing business
environment.

11

Mission and History. (n.d.) AICPA. Retrieved from AICPA.org
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The objective of US GAAP, as stated by the FASB, is the development of “high‐
quality accounting standards that serve the public interest by providing information
that is useful in making investment decisions” (Facts about FASB, n.d.). In other
words, financial reports produced under the guidelines of US GAAP should provide
decision useful information about the reporting entity to current and prospective
equity investors, lenders, and creditors. The FASB relies on two basic premises that
are vital to achieving this objective: (1) GAAP should consider the entire investing
community, not just the accounting profession and (2) it should operate
transparently through a ‘due process’ system, allowing input from all interested
parties (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield, 2012). Though not all steps will always be
necessary, the FASB outlines the seven procedures used for developing accounting
standards. The due process system is as follows:
1. Board receives recommendations for possible projects/reconsiderations
of existing standards
2. FASB chairman decides which projects to move forward with by adding
them to the technical agenda
3. Public meeting(s) held to deliberate various issues verified/identified by
staff
4. Board issues Exposure Draft (or Discussion Paper to help develop
Exposure Draft, if necessary)
5. Board holds public roundtable meetings on Exposure Draft, if necessary
6. Staff analyzes comment letters/roundtable discussions and updates
Exposure Draft, if necessary
15

7. Board issues Accounting Standards Update explaining any changes or
additions to US GAAP
If US GAAP functions correctly, from the conceptual framework to the due
process system, all interested parties should be able to make well‐informed
decisions regarding the provision of resources to an entity. Often times, however, US
GAAP fails to provide financial statement users with decision useful information. No
set of accounting standards can completely preclude fraud, but even when managers
and auditors act within the limits of US GAAP, information is not always relevant
and reliable. Just as an inherent trade‐off between relevance and comparability
exists in the conceptual framework, there is a similar challenge in standard setting.
This challenge is commonly referred to as the principles‐based versus rules‐based
debate. As you may have noticed to this point, however, I have been referring to
standards as either principles‐oriented or rules‐oriented. This difference is subtle,
but arguably quite important. To refer to a standard as ‘rules‐based’, one must imply
that principles take a back seat to rules. However, all standard are firmly rooted in
the conceptual framework. Surely, some standards have a large quantity of rules and
exceptions (accounting for earnings per share guidance extends over one hundred
fifty pages), but the issues these standards address are highly technical and require
at least some level of guidance. Rather than referring to these standards as rules‐
based, they will be referred to as rules‐oriented. Standards that are generally devoid
of these bright‐line rules and exceptions, traditionally referred to as principles‐
based, will be referred to as principles‐oriented. By focusing on orientation, as
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opposed to categorizing standards as either principles‐ or rules‐based, the
conversation is not limited to deciding between two broad, exclusive categories.
Though this discussion will be investigated more exhaustively throughout, at
an elementary level, some standards allow for things such as estimates and
valuations, thus placing a greater value on relevance. Standards regarding lease and
stock option accounting, for example, include numerous guidelines that are
intended to increase comparability. Unfortunately, managers sometimes elude these
guidelines and misrepresent economic reality, all the while within the technical
limits of US GAAP. Comparability is crucial to creating decision useful information,
but rules‐oriented standards do not always lead to the achievement of this goal.
There is a perceived grave concern that if managers are given more discretion over
accounting treatments, they will take advantage of this freedom and the financial
statements will lose a large sense of comparability in exchange for increased
relevance. However, rules do not stop malevolent managers and auditors from
acting fraudulently, and they often disallow benevolent managers from reporting
the most relevant information to the investing public. Numerous forces are at work
here, and I will argue that the potential loss of comparability is justified by the
increase in relevance, and, in turn, increase in reliability.
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US Legal Environment: Deregulation, the FASB, and the Big 5

During the 1970s, the US Congress and other federal regulatory agencies
began to loosen pricing, entry, and exit policies in the transportation, financial,
energy, and communications industries. Commenting on deregulation, Winston
(1998) remarked, “I believe that the academic community has reached a consensus
that [its] net benefits to consumers are substantial” (Winston, 1998, p. 90).
Regulated markets, he argues, tend to result in economic inefficiencies. Conversely,
deregulated markets are largely free from pricing, entry, and exit restrictions,
allowing firms to be competitive and maximize potential efficiency. During this
period of sweeping deregulation in the United States, however, the accounting
industry seemed to move in the opposite direction. In highly litigious environments,
such as the one found in the United States, standard setters grow reluctant to accept
standards that permit multiple interpretations and applications of the same
principle (Tessema, 2012), and thus they include more rules, regulations, and
guidance. Considering the legal environment and pressures from special interests
and auditors could explain the FASBs tendency to introduce increasingly complex
and detailed accounting standards (Sawabe, 2005) by the end of the 1990s. Any
existence of discretion in accounting decisions exposes managers, as well as
auditors, to a higher risk of litigation. Even if managers act in good faith and exhibit
the required professional judgment, enforcing agencies can still allege violation of a
principles‐oriented standard. As such, auditors prefer more rules‐oriented
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standards because they use readily‐determinable values, such as acquisition cost
and market price, which can serve as a layer of protection for their firm from future
legal action.
Auditors are also greatly influenced by accounting conservatism, or the
propensity to require a high degree of verification before making a legal claim to
any profit. For example, probable losses and most expenses are recognized
immediately, whereas revenue is almost never recognized until the earnings
process is complete. The idea here is that it is easier to explain an understatement
than an overstatement, especially in the court of law. Though accounting
conservatism is conducive to the United States legal environment and may serve
firms and auditors well, it does not provide the most faithfully represented picture
to investors.
Even after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)12
adjusted the United States legal system to make accounting firms less susceptible to
lawsuits by private plaintiffs (Bratton, 2003), more detailed guidance continued to
emerge in accounting standards. In the years leading up to the Enron scandal,
accounting firms realized that the risk of lawsuits based on alleged negligence and
inappropriate application of GAAP was high (Benston, Bromwich, and Wagenhofer,
2006). As a result, the accounting industry was incentivized to ask for more rules in
hope of avoiding these costly lawsuits. Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler called

Rule 10b‐5 of the PSLRA assets that a complaint must allege five sufficient facts to survive a motion
to dismiss including: (1) a misstatement or omission of (2) a material fact (3) made with intent (4)
that the plaintiff justifiably relied on (5) causing injury in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities (Skinner, 1994).

12
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these assumptions into question during their 2012 study titled “Rules‐Based
Accounting Standards and Litigation”. Somewhat intuitively, they found that
standards with more clear guidance and rules do, in fact, result in less litigation.
Interesting though, they did not find a statistically significant difference in lawsuit
outcomes13. So, is the FASB acting as an independent standard‐setting body, or is
GAAP “as much a product of political action as it is of careful logic or empirical
findings” (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield, 2012)?

Managers and auditors prefer rules, but should investors?

As Sawabe (2005) pointed out, accounting standards with more detailed
guidance are systematically favored by Anglo‐Saxon standard setters. By the year
2000, non‐audit services14 had grown to represent over fifty percent of revenue for
the Big 5 accounting firms. To find an example of compromised independence, one
need not look any further than the Enron case. Enron solidified its relationship with
Arthur Anderson in 1993 when Anderson not only provided internal audit services
to the firm, but also sold the firm its compliance system15 (Herrick and Barrionuevo,

That is, the type of standard (‘rules‐based’ or ‘principles‐based’) and presence of detailed guidance
did not have an effect on the outcome of individual lawsuits. These results, and the associated study,
will be discussed in more detail later.
14 Pursuant to Section 201 of the Act, non‐audit services include, but are not limited to: bookkeeping
of the audit client, information system design and implementation, valuation services, actuarial
services, internal audit services, human resources, investment advisory, and legal and expert
services.
15 Compliance systems help firms learn about their GAAP compliance responsibilities and ensure
employee understanding of these responsibilities. They help “manage risks associated with changing
product and service offerings and new legislation enacted to address developments in the
marketplace” (Compliance Examination Manual, n.d.).
13
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2001). In general, auditors are tasked with the often difficult undertaking of both
keeping their clients happy and performing their duty to the investing public. At
times, this can prove to be detrimental to the auditor‐client relationship. With
Enron, Arthur Anderson faced this inherent tension in addition to compromised
independence: “The audit firms’ incentive to take positions adverse to their clients’
with respect to aggressive treatments diminished correspondingly…An auditor is
hardly likely to question the effectiveness of a compliance system sold by his or her
firm” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1030). Arthur Anderson’s long‐standing relationship with
Enron certainly affected their judgment regarding Enron’s financial position and
internal controls. Arthur Anderson was motivated to maintain their very profitable
relationship with Enron, and in doing so they ignored economic reality and
approved highly questionable transactions, ultimately cumulating in one of the
world’s largest ever accounting frauds.
Throughout the 1990s, the accounting profession lobbied with frequency and
success. Bratton (2003) alleged that the profession had “become famously
aggressive protecting its own interests and those of it clients in the corridors of
power in Washington” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1033). Special interest groups fighting for
the accounting profession shot down reform to accounting for stock options16 and
consulting fees. Many raised concern, including Arthur Levitt in his book Take on the
Street, about what was happening on Wall Street and in Corporate America
regarding these issues, especially consulting fees. As mentioned above, by the year

A stock option gives an individual an opportunity, but not an obligation, to purchase a share of a
company’s stock at a predetermined price at a point or during a specified period in the future.
16
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2000, non‐audit services had reached over fifty percent of total revenue for the Big
5. A major component of those services was consulting fees. Often times, accounting
firms provided their clients with both consultation and audit services. Consulting fee
reform called for a separation of these duties. As it stood, accounting firms were
essentially auditing the work of their own employees. Excluding the possibility of
collusion, audit engagement teams were less likely to doubt work provided by their
own firm. With this framework in place, “no institutional mechanism ensures that
the public interest trumps the interests of audit firms and their clients in GAAP’s
promulgation” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1038). Thus, accounting firms were more
incentivized to keep customers happy while generating consulting fees than to
demand that the economic reality of the client has been faithfully presented to the
investing public, creditors, and banks. If managers and auditors disagreed on an
issue, auditors’ only recourse was to recommend a different accounting treatment,
but they often did so at the risk of losing both the audit and consulting fees.
Standard creation and reform gives rise to another complicated issue.
Throughout the SEC’s existence, the commission has delegated the task of
accounting standard creation to private, independently funded groups17.
Unfortunately, though, at times the “agency delegation model” (Bratton, 2003) has
failed and these groups have fallen prey to special interests. For example, stock
option accounting reform was first tried by the APB in 1972, and again by the FASB
during the 1990s. In 1972, many were calling for the immediate expensing of the
granting of stock options to employees and managers. With the issuance of APB
17

These groups are as follows: CAP (1939‐1959), APB (1959‐1973), and FASB (1973‐Present).
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Opinion 25, the APB allowed managers to continue not expensing stock options if
the option price was below market value on the grant date (Miller and Bahnson,
2002). Rather than providing clarification on a highly debated issue, the APB
created a bright‐line rule that essentially allowed and arguably encouraged
managers to pay employees, and themselves, large amounts of compensation
without recording any expenses. This was a big win for industry, and when these
unreported expenses reached large proportions of the income statement in the early
1990s, the FASB was forced to return to the issue. The FASB proposed that an
expense should be recorded equal to the value of the stock options on grant date. To
the huge relief of managers, the FASB compromised with SFAS 123, merely
suggesting the reporting of an expense on the income statement but permitting the
reporting in a pro forma footnote (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). The agency
delegation model “works well only so long as the agency successfully resists capture
by the interests of the actors it regulates” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1032). The FASB has
shown time and time again that it will succumb to political pressure. These
pressures often come from industry, but they can also come from the SEC and
Congress. SFAS 123 was largely influenced by the preparer constituency, which
exploded and called upon members of Congress to threaten the board with
extinction (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). The FASB can exist only so long as Congress
recognizes it as the standard‐setting body. As such, they have very little room to
disregard the will of the Congress, even if they do not agree with the Congress’s
position. After the fall of Arthur Anderson, the fear grew that if any of the remaining
four firms were able to gain a direct or indirect influence over the FASB, they would
23

stop at nothing to protect their rents from further restriction. As accounting
standards stand, Bratton believes they “will continue to be the best choice in a
second‐best world so long as they constrain managers and auditors most of the time
[from opportunistic behavior]” (Bratton, 2003, p. 1037).

The Rules vs. Principles Debate: An Introduction

As mentioned above, the primary objective of the FASB is to “establish and
improve standards and financial reporting for the guidance and education of the
public, which includes issuers, auditors, and users of financial information” (Facts
about FASB, n.d.). Basing these standards on the conceptual framework, the FASB
hopes that financial statement preparers will adhere to the concepts of relevance,
reliability, and comparability in the promotion of decision usefulness. Once a
standard has been conceptualized and created, the next step is implementation of
said standard. There are two dominant thoughts on the process of implementation.
One school of thought argues that standards should be very heavily based on the
principles inherent in the conceptual framework. The other school of thought
believes that standards should include detailed guidance, or rules, regarding how
that standard should be implemented. As a result of this difference, the ‘rules vs.
principles’ debate were born. Think of the following example for a moment: curfew
for a high school student. The parents of the high school student have two options.
The first is that they may set their child’s curfew for, say, 1:00 AM. This would be
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characterized as a bright‐line rule, one that allows the child to return home at 12:59
AM unscathed. However, if the child was to return home at 1:01 AM, he or she could,
and likely would, face the wrath of mom and dad, and rightfully so. Conversely, the
parents of the high school student could tell their child to return home at a
‘reasonable time’. In this situation, it is largely up to the child to determine what was
meant by reasonable. It may be the case that child decides that a reasonable time is
12:00 AM. It may also be the case, and most parents would likely agree with this
sentiment, that the child would interpret a reasonable time as 3:00 AM. As such, it
seems that rules are a better solution to this dilemma.
The solution may not be so evident, though. There are two primary forces at
play here. The first is that the child may very well return home at 12:00 AM. This
makes both the child and the parent happy. The second force is that if the child was
to return home at 3:00 AM, it is likely that his or her parents will be very upset and
he or she will face a consequence. As such, he or she will be much less likely to
return home late again. Initially, there may be some costs involved on both sides in
trying to understand each other’s desires and arrive on an agreed time. Ultimately,
though, the parents and child will arrive upon a reasonable time to return home,
and both will be happier.
Although this example is relatively elementary, it illustrates some of the key
arguments posed by proponents of principles‐oriented and rules‐oriented
approaches to standard‐setting. All standards are based on the conceptual
framework, and are thus grounded in principles. They earn their distinction based
on the presence of rules, exceptions, and guidance. The GAAP hierarchy is a
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descriptive term explaining preferences either toward overarching concepts and
principles or toward specific, context‐bound rules. Many are concerned that GAAP
has grown to represent the latter, a guidance heavy, rules‐oriented set of standards
that place greater emphasis on the form of certain rules than the substance of the
principles (Benston, Bromwich, and Wagenhofer, 2006; Bailey and Sawers, 2012;
Tessema, 2012). Yet, others are not so convinced. Following the fallout of the Enron
scandal, both the SEC and FASB issued reports on the value of ‘principles‐based’
standards. They concluded that there was indeed a problem with accounting
standards in the United States, but they were hesitant to describe GAAP as solely
‘rules‐based’. Whichever characterization of US GAAP is true, Bailey and Sawers
point to prior research suggesting that “managers and accounting professionals use
the latitude in accounting standards, either judgment in applying principles or
structuring transactions around rigid rules, to manage earnings and support
aggressive financial reporting” (Bailey and Sawers, 2012, p. 27). There seems to
have been a shift in the application of accounting standards from attempting to
accurately communicate the economic reality of a transaction to merely being in
compliance with standards. In other words, whether the standard being applied is
more rules‐oriented or more principles‐oriented in nature, the evidence seems to
suggest that managers are focusing more on presenting the firm in the most positive
light that GAAP will allow rather than attempting to faithfully represent the firm
(Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996; Salterio and Koonce, 1997; Nelson and Kinney,
1997; Hoffman and Patton, 2002).
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Rules‐Oriented Standards: Defined
Before the conversation can continue, it is important to define the terms
being discussed. US GAAP has been characterized as a highly influential and
regarded system of rules. Though all may not agree with this characterization
entirely, the FASB did seem to have been trending towards standards with an
extremely high level of specification around the turn of the century. Eaton
remarked, “keeping the account preparers inside the rules meant anticipating where
they would find loopholes and closing them off” (Eaton, 2005, p. 7). Historically, the
FASB had done quite a good job policing these loopholes and issuing more detailed
guidance on how to deal with them as they emerged. Unfortunately, it only takes one
major slip up to derail the entire effort. The focus on and call for more principles‐
oriented standards really emerged when it was revealed in 2001 that Enron had
taken advantage of a complex, highly detailed accounting standard. Though both
Enron and Arthur Anderson alike ignored many of the principles behind the
standard, GAAP still absorbed a large hit, even causing Congress, the SEC, and the
FASB to question its value.
Yet, rules are not fundamentally bad or even ineffective. One of the many
advantages of more rules‐oriented accounting standards is that they provide clear
guidance to both preparers and auditors. This guidance can significantly reduce
managers’ ability to influence or manipulate relevant accounting numbers
(Tessema, 2012). The SEC states that “Inherent in a rules‐based approach is the
intent to minimize the judgmental component of accounting practice through the
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establishment of finely articulated rules that attempt to foresee all possible
application situations” (SEC, 2003). With the exception of a few very large,
publicized frauds, these more rules‐oriented standards have functioned seemingly
well in the United States. Rules and detailed guidance give standards‐setters the
ability to accurately and effectively communicate their requirements and intentions
to managers. The clear expression of these expectations can help to reduce the
imprecision and uncertainty that allow managers to potentially report aggressively
(Nobes, 2005; Schipper, 2003). In fact, Katherine Schipper, a member of the FASB
when they published their commentary on principles‐based accounting standards,
remarked that rules give financial statements increased comparability and provide
auditors and regulators with increased ability to verify those financial statements
(Schipper, 2003). Though some have argued that rules simply create a safe harbor
under which auditors can hide from litigation, rules do give auditors the ability to
consistently apply standards amongst clients, between auditing firms, and across
the United States. Rules‐oriented standards certainly are not perfect, but as Bratton
(2003) suggested, they may be better than the alternative.

Principles‐Oriented Standards: Defined
Principles‐oriented standards rest primarily on the concept of ‘substance
over form’. In other words, this principle ensures that the financial statements
present a relevant and reliable representation of actual transactions and events.
Application of the ‘substance over form’ concept involves the question of whether
the firm has presented its financial statements such that they represent economic
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reality (substance), or that they merely present compliance with the letter of the law
(form). Bratton (2003) characterizes principles‐oriented standards as more broadly
stated, often excluding particular application guidance on their face. Though some
standards are objectively rules‐oriented18, even principles‐oriented standards can
work like rules when applied literally. As firms grow increasingly innovative,
complex, and specialized, so do their transactions. As such, the particulars of these
transactions may differ considerably or slightly, yet rules enforce common
treatment. Though Schipper (2003) was hesitant to describe US GAAP as rules‐
oriented, she did admit that a more principles‐based system is desirable because
such a system permits the appropriate exercise of professional judgment to
auditors.
Principles‐oriented standards intentionally avoid exhaustive specifications,
relying on the conceptual framework and the principles included therein. GAAP was
created with the intent to convey four basic principles: relevance, consistency,
verifiability, and full disclosure. Though there is a strong theoretical argument for
principles‐oriented accounting standards (Sawabe, 2005; Eaton, 2005; Tessema,
2012), it is not quite so simple in practice. There exists an inherent tension in the
current conceptual framework. For example, the framework requires verifiable
information but also requires that information to be relevant. At times, the most
relevant numbers may not be verifiable, and vice versa. For example, GAAP permits

The most classic example is the standards regarding lease accounting. These standards contain
many bright‐line rules, including cut‐off points and yes‐or‐no distinctions, which decide how certain
leases should be accounted for. Lease accounting will be discussed in further detail later.
18
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the use of fair value accounting19. Fair values are not always readily determinable,
especially in highly specialized industries, but they are often more relevant than
more objective measures of value, like historical cost. In creating standards that
permit the use of fair value accounting, the FASB sometimes places a higher value on
relevance than verifiability since managers likely know most about their firm’s
transactions and economic reality. In a theoretical world in which managers are
completely benevolent, a solely principles‐oriented set of accounting standards
would function better. However, this does not describe the world GAAP functions in.
Financial statement users would likely require increased disclosures outlining the
accounting treatment decision‐making process, leading to potential inefficiencies.
Now that both rules‐oriented standards and principles‐oriented standards
have been defined, the ‘accounting standards continuum’ can be introduced. On one
end of the continuum are more broadly‐defined principles. On the other end of the
continuum are more highly‐detailed rules. As discussed above, detailed rules can
increase verifiability and consistency by providing managers and auditors with
guidance. Alternatively, broad principles can increase relevance by giving managers
the ability to more faithfully represent their firm’s financial position. Around the
turn of the century, the pendulum had swung towards the rules‐oriented end of the
spectrum. Since the Enron scandal, subsequent fallout, and implementation of
Sarbanes‐Oxley, the pendulum began swinging back in the direction of principles,
though still on the rules side of the continuum. There are many opinions about the
Under US GAAP (FAS 157), fair value is the amount at which the asset could be bought or sold in a
current transaction between willing parties, or transferred to an equivalent party, other than in a
liquidation sale (Summary of Statement No. 157).
19
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optimal position for US GAAP on the accounting standards continuum.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus about that position between managers,
accountants, and the regulatory bodies. The SEC explored the debate about the
optimal position in a report issued in 2003, suggesting a potential combination of
rules‐based and principles‐based standards. Though the study has prompted
numerous discussions between the FASB and the IASB, nothing tangible has
resulted thus far.

SEC Study on the Adoption of a Principles‐Based Accounting System
sdfg
Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, the SEC conducted a
study on the adoption of a principles‐based accounting system during 2003. As
suggested above, many groups and individuals, from investors to creditors to
managers to even the CEO of Arthur Anderson, pointed to the failure of US GAAP in
preventing the accounting scandals of 2001‐2002. The SEC examined whether US
GAAP is, in fact, a rules‐based set of accounting standards, as well as the potential
value of a more principles‐based set of standards. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, the most
significant piece of securities legislation since the creation of the SEC, called upon
the SEC to “conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial reporting
system of a principles‐based accounting system” (SEC, 2003). The growing concern
in the United States was that US GAAP had become too oriented around bright‐line
tests, which allowed managers to misuse the current standards by complying with
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the letter of the law but not the spirit of standard. There was also a large concern
about the growing level of exceptions to the underlying principles of certain
standards, permitting firms to treat similar transactions and events with similar
economic substance differently. Another concern revolved around the increasing
need and demand for detailed implementation guidance, creating complexity and
ambiguity about the application of US GAAP.
Bearing in mind these concerns, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act mandated that the
SEC explore the following four areas:
(i) the extent to which principles‐based accounting and financial reporting
exists in the United States; (ii) the length of time required for change from a
rules‐based to a principles‐based financial reporting system; (iii) the
feasibility of and proposed methods by which a principles‐based system may
be implemented; and (iv) a thorough economic analysis of the
implementation of a principles‐based system (SEC, 2003).
As a result, the SEC determined that the current system of financial reporting and
corporate governance were in need of improvement. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act may
be viewed as a legislative attempt “to better align the incentives of management,
auditors and other professionals with those of investors” (SEC, 2003). This study
evaluated the ways in which the SEC and the FASB may achieve the goals set forth
by the Act. At the conclusion of the report, the SEC laid out the following six action
items: in the short‐term, conduct a comprehensive review of current standards to
identify and address those that are rules‐oriented, establish one standard setter,
begin working towards accounting standard convergence with the IASB, and issue
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more principles‐oriented standards, and in the long‐term, conduct conceptual
framework improvement projects and redefine the GAAP hierarchy.
At some point, or more likely over a period of time, the system of checks and
balances critical to investor confidence in financial reporting began to deteriorate.
Though the SEC acknowledged that no standard‐setting regime can completely
preclude fraud, they did suggest an optimal standard setting process. In studying the
current condition of US GAAP, they concluded that “imperfections exist when
standards are established on either a rules‐based or a principles‐only basis” (SEC,
2003). ‘Principles‐only’ standards present a problem because they provide
managers and auditors with very little guidance for exercising professional
judgment. This lack of guidance can lead to a significant loss of comparability
because the potential exists for similar transactions to be accounted for differently.
Conversely, ‘rules‐based’ standards can provide not only a vehicle but also a defense
for evading the intent of the standard. Rules‐based standards can provide managers
with a roadmap to circumvent accounting standards and result in financial reports
that are not representationally faithful. As such, the SEC was hesitant to characterize
US GAAP as entirely ‘rules‐based’, but they did offer a solution to improve the
current standard‐setting process.
These more principles‐based, or objective‐oriented standards, should have
the following characteristics: established from an improved conceptual framework,
have a clearly articulated objective, provide enough detail and structure to be
applied consistently, have minimal exceptions, and avoid the use of bright‐lines, or
percentage tests, that give preparers the ability to structure transactions to achieve
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technical compliance while evading intent (SEC, 2003). The exact methods of
implementation the SEC suggested will be discussed at greater length below, but the
underlying message was holding managers and auditors accountable for reporting
the substance of transactions. As a result, financial reports would be seen as an act of
communication rather than merely an act of compliance. The SEC concluded that
though the costs of this transition would likely be high and the magnitude of the
benefits

difficult

to

quantify,

“the

benefits

of

adopting

objectives‐

oriented…standards in the US justify the costs” (SEC, 2003). Though the FASB has
voiced continued support of adoption, little headway has actually been made. For
example, after placing leasing accounting reform on their agendas in 2006, the FASB
and IASB began working jointly in 2009. On May 16, 2013, the FASB issued a
revision to the 2010 proposed Accounting Standard Update, Leases. The FASB and
IASB are currently considering all feedback and re‐deliberating the significant issues
raised, hoping to issue another exposure draft during the first quarter 2014. Though
they are close to reaching a consensus, the FASB and IASB have yet to issue an
update to leasing standards after eight years. Nobes (2005) attributes this inability
produce an update to the FASBs proclivity for arbitrary rules and IASBs proclivity
for vagueness. The report suggested a redefinition of the conceptual framework as a
long‐term goal, but in order for these two standard‐setting bodies to produce
anything meaningful in a timely manner, they must better align at the conceptual
level. Though the SEC report did offer valuable insights and proposed interesting
suggestions, the ideas have not yet materialized.
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Regulatory Arbitrage: The Issues with Rules‐Oriented Standards

The findings and subsequent suggestions presented in the SEC report are
based on the notion that rules‐oriented standards can be problematic, and that
more principles‐oriented standards may offer a solution to those problems. One of
the primary driving forces behind the rules‐oriented issue is regulatory arbitrage. In
other words, rules‐oriented standards allow for the dominance of legal form over
economic substance. Eaton (2005) points out the existence of a “perception among
many US accountants that bright line rules invite deceptive accounting” (Eaton,
2005, p. 9). That is not to say that regulatory arbitrage is encouraged by
accountants. Rather, the potential to engineer transactions exists and is more likely
to occur under a rules‐oriented standard‐setting regime.
But why is this transaction engineering such an issue? In the discussion of
the conceptual framework and its connection to rules‐oriented standards,
comparability is cited as one of the most crucial features of these types of standards.
Further, relevance often suffers in order to increase comparability between firms
and consistency over time. However, when regulatory arbitrage occurs, it can result
in

‘surface

comparability’

(Alexander

and

Jermakowicz,

2006).

Surface

comparability arises when “the application of specific rules may require
economically different situations to be accounted for identically” (Alexander and
Jermakowicz, 2006). Tessema (2012) defines this phenomenon as pseudo‐
comparability. In these cases, rules prevent managers from faithfully representing
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their financial position, giving rise to the necessity for exceptions. As transactions
grown increasingly complex, standard setters are often faced with a decision to add
exceptions and guidance, which may further increase complexity, or leave the
standard as is, which can restrict managers from faithfully representing their firms.
Another, more dangerous, type of surface comparability appears as a result
of real earnings management, or “a change in the structure of transactions or events
in order to avoid the consequences specified by an accounting standard” (Tessema,
2012). Financial statements are intended to reflect the economic reality of the firms
they represent. They should reflect if firms have highly cyclical income or if firms
own or lease their assets. Tessema argues tighter, rules‐oriented accounting
standards do increase real earnings management. With leases, for example,
managers often construct lease contracts in such a way that the terms fall just
within the bright‐line thresholds set forth by the standard. As a result, firms are able
to materially change the presentation of their financial statements. Benston,
Bromwich, and Wagenhofer (2006) attributed a large part of the Enron scandal to
this phenomenon. Though rules‐oriented standards are based off the conceptual
framework, they foster an environment of compliance: “Enron could claim and
Anderson concurred that calling the simultaneous purchase of two very different
assets was a ‘business’ because there was no rule to say that it wasn’t” (Benston,
Bromwich, and Wagenhofer, 2006, p. 177). However, the rules themselves are not
the only things to blame. Yes, US GAAP did technically permit Enron to act as they
did, but the individuals at Enron actively chose to take advantage of these loopholes.
In times of crisis, there is a propensity to point fingers at the accounting industry
36

and the accounting standards, but lack of integrity by management is an often
overlooked driver in many cases. As standards continue to include a growing
number of rules and exceptions, it becomes more and more conceivable that these
rules could contradict principles, but there must also be individuals to take
advantage of these contradictions.
In summary, the potential for contradictions to exist causes uneasiness and
lack of trust in the more rules‐oriented US GAAP (Bailey and Sawers, 2012).
Managers may be incentivized to structure transactions around the rules, leading to
potential manipulation of financial information. In turn, investors may be
sufficiently incentivized to more thoroughly examine financial reporting decisions
by management (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). This lack of trust in financial reporting
does not serve the investing public and causes unnecessary uncertainty. Investors
are left to wonder whether relevant facts have been misreported or unreported.
This can lead to an overall higher cost of capital20, retarding economic growth and
inhibiting stability (Miller and Bahnson, 2002).

Principles‐Oriented Standards: A potential solution?

Though there were likely many driving forces, the US accounting scandals of
2001‐2002 provided a spark that energized the conversation about a more
principles‐oriented US GAAP. As Sawabe (2005) suggested, “The principles‐based
From an investor’s perspective, cost of capital refers to the accepted level of return required by
shareholders to invest.
20
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approach to standard setting was a conscious strategy to counter creative
accounting” (Sawabe, 2005). As a growing number of rules were issued, managers
responded by continually redesigning their creative accounting instruments. As new
loopholes were discovered, new rules would be issued, further complicating the
standard implementation process. With the following quote, explains why firms,
auditors, and regulators desire rules:
“Companies want detailed guidance because those details eliminate
uncertainties about how transactions should be structured. Auditors want
specificity because those specific requirements limit the number of difficult
disputes with clients and may provide a defense in litigation. Securities
regulators want detailed guidance because those details are thought to be
easier to enforce” (Sawabe, 2005).
As you may recall, the primary objective of the conceptual framework is to provide
decision useful information to financial statement users. Though Sawabe highlights
valid concerns held by the three groups, he fails to acknowledge the most important
group, investors. Standard implementation has somewhat become an act of
compliance rather than an act of communication, and investors have suffered as a
result (SEC, 2003).
Some managers are currently taking advantage of the loopholes in US GAAP,
and their auditors are permitting these actions because they are technically within
the limits of the standards. This is as much an issue of integrity as it is an issue with
the set of standards. Managers are making the choice to exploit the gaps in GAAP,
and auditors are allowing it to happen. It seems that a more principles‐oriented
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GAAP would give managers the ability to distort economic reality even further, but
as many have suggested, this shift could alternatively realign manager incentives.
Currently, managers are practically encouraged to take advantage of accounting
loopholes because there are between little and no consequences. They get away
with things like off‐balance sheet financing every year, and GAAP helps justify these
actions. With a more principles‐oriented set of standards, managers would have to
justify their accounting treatments based on economic reality, no longer able to hide
behind rules and exceptions. This does not necessarily address issues of
professional integrity, but it could realign management and auditor incentives. Over
time, managers might rethink their implementation of US GAAP as an act of
communication rather than an act of compliance.
Though she acknowledges the merits of more principles‐oriented standards,
Schipper (2003) ultimately rejects the notion of ‘principles‐only’ standards, citing
the resulting potential reduction in comparability, consistency, and regulatory
enforcement as her primary reasoning. Similarly, the FASB issued a Proposal in
October 2002: Principles‐Based Approach to US Standard Setting (MacDonald, 2002).
MacDonald explained that much of the complexity and detail found in accounting
standards had been demand‐driven. She claimed that much of the detailed guidance
was introduced as a result of requests from managers and auditors. Likewise,
MacDonald concluded the FASB Proposal by rejecting ‘principles‐only’ standards.
She feared that standards without detailed rules “could lead to situations in which
professional judgments, made in good faith, result in different interpretations for
similar transactions or events, raising concerns about comparability” (MacDonald,
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2002). Though this is a valid concern, as discussed above, surface comparability can
often be the result of rules. As Alexander and Jermakowicz (2006) reminded,
managers likely have the deepest knowledge and understanding of their firm’s
economic reality and, thus, how it should be accounted for. However, managers
sometimes ignore economic reality and choose the most beneficial accounting
treatment because they are protected by bright‐line rules. Principles‐oriented
standards could actually curtail this behavior because managers would be required
to provide their rationale for given treatments to their auditors, and their auditors
would have to assess these explanations on their value rather than their adherence
to a rule. Especially in the post‐Enron world, auditors are even more incentivized to
prevent fraud and avoid the fate of Arthur Anderson at all cost.
Detailed rules can often stifle a standards ability to allow for faithful
representation, discrediting professional judgment. Perhaps worse, though, the
existence of detailed rules can provide a roadmap for ‘economic discretion’ (Sawabe,
2005). Rules‐orientated standards are intended to curtail accounting discretions.
Accounting discretion refers “to those [discretions] relating to accounting
treatments of recognition and measurement” (Sawabe, 2005). Though these
treatments can have a potential material impact on the financial statements, they do
not affect the economic substance of the firm. That is, cash inflows and outflows are
not altered by accounting discretion. Economic discretion, alternatively, can have an
impact on the economic substance of the firm. Sawabe argues that “Economic
discretions are usually more costly than accounting discretions because they affect
cash flows for the sake of accounting numbers” (Sawabe, 2005). Though detailed
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rules can prevent numerous accounting treatments of similar transactions and
events, they also provide a safe harbor for managers and auditors to hide behind.
Managers are protected by adhering to the precise guidelines provided in US GAAP.
In addition, auditors are less inclined to question their clients’ accounting numbers
because they met each line‐item on a, sometimes arbitrary, checklist. This can be
especially harmful and costly because questionable transactions are often accepted
when they fall within the detailed guidelines of certain standards. Investors, in turn,
are potentially given a false sense of confidence in the reliability and comparability
of financial statements.
With a move away from more rules‐oriented standards back to their
principle‐oriented roots, many have suggested that more relevant and reliable
information would result (Miller and Bahnson, 2002; Nobes, 2005; Agoglia,
Doupnik, and Tsakumis, 2011). Though managers and auditors prefer rules, “the
less precise the standard, the more concerned preparers are about second‐guessing
and possible costs imposed through regulation and litigation” (Agoglia, Doupnik,
and Tsakumis, 2011, p. 749). With less detailed guidance, managers are highly
incentivized to represent the underlying economics of their firm as accurately as
possible. One thing to consider, though, is managers’ compensation is usually tied, in
some capacity, to firm performance. Managers may have stock options that are tied
to the stock price or bonuses dependent on earnings per share targets, so there may
be an incentive to inflate the firm’s earnings. In a 2013 study, Ali and Zhang looked
at the relationship between CEO tenure and earnings management. They found that
CEOs are generally highly incentivized to avoid misstating earnings in order to
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prevent loss of reputation (Ali and Zhang, 2013). Experience has shown that this is
not true of all managers, especially those in their first or final years, but a more
principles‐oriented US GAAP could incentivize managers to faithfully represent their
firms. If managers make a concerted effort to fairly portray economic reality and
they have sufficient evidence to support their choices, “then they will be better able
to defend themselves when second‐guessed by external parties” (Agoglia, Doupnik,
and Tsakumis, 2011, p. 752). The result of this more principles‐oriented world
should be better information for financial statement users. If managers and auditors
are wary of potential litigation and reputation loss, they should be incentivized to
represent their firms faithfully, and have strong evidence to support why they chose
a particular accounting treatment. Earnings management exists in part because US
GAAP permits it and in part because managers are opportunistic. A potential
solution is to alter US GAAP, removing the rules and exceptions that allow managers
to point at the standards for protection. There will still be opportunistic managers,
but they will lack the bright‐line rules to hide behind.
When a regulatory body takes down stop lights and road blocks (or bright‐
lines), the assumption is that chaos will necessarily ensue. Perhaps this example can
shine some light onto the debate. Public officials in London were experiencing a
crisis. Faced with a growing population, one of the busiest intersections in the city
was getting busier. The intersection had essentially halted to a stop, creating traffic
for miles in all directions. They brought in civil engineers from across the world, and
no one could seem to find a solution to the congestion. The tinkered with the
duration of wait times, the number of stop lights, and they even tried instituting a
42

fee to use the road, but nothing worked. Eventually, one individual proposed a
seemingly insane solution: simply remove all of the stop lights and signs. The idea
was shot down initially by many, objecting that no one would ever stop. However,
the idea was eventually approved, and within months, the traffic had not only
improved, but was practically free flowing. Though there were obviously many
forces at work here, one of the most important was that of incentives. At the most
basic level, drivers were incentivized not to crash into each other. They quickly
learned how to not only avoid collisions, but also how to communicate and move
freely amongst one another.
There is no evidence to suggest that removing all rules from accounting
standards would lead to a similar outcome as the one above, and that claim is not
being made. Rather, the example provides an interesting insight into the economic
concept of incentives. People, and firms, tend to act in their own self‐interest. A
sometimes overlooked aspect of the ‘principles‐rules’ debate is that there are costs,
in fact very large ones, related to managers reporting fraudulent accounting
numbers and auditors approving those numbers. Lawsuits and, more importantly,
reputations are at stake. Similar to the stoplight example, Christopher Nobes, a
Professor at the University of Reading, England, proposed a solution to improve
standard clarity: a reduction in rules. His study was based on the notion that the
“use of a more appropriate principle would reduce the need for arbitrary and
detailed rules” (Nobes, 2005, p. 32). Rather than increasing guidance to account for
the ever evolving business world, he suggested retooling standards to more closely
reflect principles from the conceptual framework. The argument is that the need for
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guidance develops, in part, from demand by managers and auditors, but also from
‘rouge principles’ (Nobes, 2005) that may not align directly with the conceptual
framework. He provides numerous examples that could improve from a reduction in
rules including: lease accounting, financial assets, subsidiaries, and equity
accounting. These examples tangibly highlight some of the problems associated with
more rules‐oriented standards, and will be discussed in more detail shortly. The
bottom line is that a reduction in rules can be associated with “increased clarity,
decreased complexity, and decreased motivation for the structuring of transactions”
(Nobes, 2005, p. 27), placing a greater emphasis on economic substance than legal
form.

Example: Lease Accounting – Form over substance?
Though there are countless examples of rules‐oriented standards that fail to
accomplish their goal of faithful representation, none is more visibly guilty than
accounting for leases. According to a study published by the Equipment Leasing and
Finance Foundation21, the global equipment finance market returned pre‐Great
Recession levels by 2012, an estimated $725 billion business. Many different types
of equipment are being leased, from helicopters to bulldozers to computers to
airliners. The players involved in these transactions are lessees and lessors. The
lessee negotiates the right to use specific property for a specified amount of time,
while the lessor owns the property in question. In return for the use, the lessee
makes rental payments to the lessor over the agreed upon time of the lease. Though

The Equipment Leasing and Finance Foundation is an independent, not‐for‐profit foundation that
studies markets, trends, and operations relating to the equipment finance industry.

21
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this may seem relatively straight forward, US GAAP allows for two different
categorizations: capital leases and operating leases. An operating lease allows the
manager to record the expense related to rent immediately on the firm’s income
statement. A capital lease, conversely, requires that managers capitalize equipment
and record the present value of the total lease payments on their balance sheet.
Most managers prefer operating leases because they do not have to record an asset
on their books, or the corresponding liability. The incurrence of this additional
liability affects certain financial ratios and income in the early years of the lease,
among other things. Though managers would almost always prefer operating leases,
the FASB recognizes that some transaction should be capitalized, so they developed
a set of criteria to determine proper accounting treatment.
The FASB developed four criteria for establishing whether a lease should be
capitalized or expensed immediately. The criteria are as follows: the transfer of
ownership test, the bargain‐purchase option test, the economic life test, and the
recovery of investment test (Miller and Bahnson, 2002). The first criterion, the
transfer of ownership test, is straight forward and relatively easy to apply. Simply
put, if ownership transfers at the completion of the lease, then the lease must be
capitalized. The next three criteria, however, are not so easy to test and have created
numerous controversies. The second criterion, the bargain‐purchase option test,
allows the lessee to purchase the asset at the end of the lease at a ‘bargain’. This
bargain price is determined by estimating the future fair value of the asset, and
setting the purchase price at a point well below that estimate. The third criterion,
the economic life test, asserts that if the term of the lease is longer than seventy‐five
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percent of the useful life of the asset, then the asset must be capitalized. Not only can
useful life be difficult to determine, managers also have the ability to contrast the
lease term to last just under seventy‐five percent of the useful life. The final
criterion, the recovery of investment test, states that if the present value of the
minimum lease payments22 equals or exceeds ninety percent of the value of the
asset, then the asset must be capitalized.
As you have likely realized, lease accounting is subject to abuse. One can
imagine that managers make concerted efforts to circumvent the intent of US GAAP
and expense whenever possible. One could argue that there are certain leases that
should be accounted for using the operating method, but almost all leases should be
capitalized. Benefits to expensing rather than capitalizing include: materially
reducing liabilities that should be included in the financial statements and
smoothing of expenses23. An unintended consequence of the rules‐oriented lease
accounting standard is the propensity for firms to “beat the lease standard” (Dieter,
1979). Managers can relatively easily achieve their goal of avoiding lease
capitalization by creative design, writing, and interpretation of lease agreements.
Though it may be intuitive, some of the most common ways in which managers
avoid capitalization are as follows: (1) ensure that there is no specified transfer of
title, (2) exclude a bargain‐purchase option, (3) set the lease term to some duration
22 Three important concepts contribute to determining the present value of minimum lease
payments: total minimum lease payments, executory costs, and discount rate. Minimum lease
payments include the minimum payments the lessee has agreed to pay to the lessor (including, but
not limited to, all rental payments). Executory costs refer to things such as insurance, maintenance,
and tax expenses. Once these previous two amounts are summed, they are discounted to present
value based on the discount rate, or the rate the lessee would have incurred to borrow the funds
necessary to buy the leased asset (Ely, 1995).
23 Smoothing is a concept that will be more fully explored in the next section.
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less than seventy‐five percent of the useful life, and (4) arrange for the present value
of the minimum lease payments to be less than ninety percent of the value of the
asset (Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield, 2012).
Though many have recommended reform to lease accounting (Dieter, 1979;
Nobes, 2005; Agoglia, Doupnik, and Tsakumis, 2011), little has come of these
recommendations. As Nobes (2005) suggested, political unpopularity may be the
biggest obstacle to reform. Leasing standards predate a clear definition of what
constitutes a liability. Issued in December 1985, the FASB defined liabilities in
Concept Statement No. 6 as “probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising
from obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets…to other entities”. In other
words, a liability arises when one firm is contractually obligated to pay another firm
in exchange for a service or product. Nobes (2005) believes that much of the
arbitrary detail found in GAAP can be remedied by applying a more appropriate
principle. Rather than adjusting the current rules, exceptions, and guidance, he
believes standard setters should place a greater focus on reflecting the substance of
the standard from the start. As such, “obligation under all noncancelable leases meet
the definition of ‘liability’ and should therefore be [capitalized]” (Nobes, 2005, p.
28). As referenced above, lease accounting standards were introduced in January
1977, a full eight years before liabilities were concretely conceptualized. Thinking
about these noncancelable leases as liabilities would, in part, solve the problems
associated with over‐expensing and under‐capitalizing leases. A more principles‐
oriented approach to lease accounting “would not lead to imprecision, lack of
verifiability, or lack of comparability. All noncancelable leases would be treated in
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the same way” (Nobes, 2005, p. 28). Furthermore, Agoglia, Doupnik, and Tsakumis
(2011) found that financial statement preparers are less likely to report
aggressively when applying a less precise criterion. This is just one example that
displays a possible benefit to a reduction in rules‐oriented standards. Though lease
accounting reform has been on the docket since 2006, and the FASB and IFRS are
working together to arrive upon a better accounting standard, the FASB has yet to
issue a finalized Accounting Standard Update. A third Exposure Draft will be issued
sometime during first quarter 2014, but lease accounting will remain unchanged
until at least then. The mere fact that the FASB and the IASB are working towards
change suggests that the current standards are in need of improvement.

Accounting Standard Orientation and Litigation

Though some of the concepts discussed in their study24 have been alluded to
thus far, University of Texas professors Dain Donelson and John McInnis and
University of Iowa professor Richard Mergenthaler examine the competing claims
that: (1) rules‐oriented standards shield firms from litigation and (2) violations of
detailed rules give plaintiffs a ‘roadmap’ to successful litigation. The purpose of their
study was to “inform this debate by investigating whether rules‐based standards are
associated with the incidence and outcome of securities class action litigation”
(Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler, 2012, p. 1247). They characterized the two

24

Rules‐Based Accounting Standards and Litigation
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prevalent, competing theories about the relationship between rules‐oriented
standards and litigation: the ‘protection’ theory and the ‘roadmap’ theory. The
protection theory asserts that rules‐oriented standards lead to lower incidents of
lawsuits and decrease the likelihood of unfavorable suit outcomes. This theory
contends with the notion that “the specificity of rules‐based standards provides
plaintiffs with a clear path to successful litigation” (Donelson, McInnis, and
Mergenthaler, 2012, p. 1248). The protection theory gives defendants two lines of
defense. First, if firms do not admit to an accounting misstatement, then it is very
difficult for plaintiffs to uncover if firms have violated any standards and are guilty
of wrongdoing. They are shielded by a ‘safe harbor’, protected by the fact that there
is not always access to transparent information. Second, if firms do admit an
accounting misstatement, “Managers violating rules‐based standards can argue that
[it] was an innocent mistake caused by the complexities of GAAP” (Donelson,
McInnis, and Mergenthaler, 2012, p. 1248). In essence, firms can hide under the
bright‐lines of accounting rules, or they can admit wrongdoing and then blame the
highly detailed bright‐lines for making GAAP too complex, causing an innocent
misstatement.
The roadmap theory, conversely, asserts that rules‐oriented standards
actually lead to higher incidents of lawsuits and increase the likelihood of
unfavorable suit outcomes. The argument behind the protection theory is that intent
is very difficult to prove. If there is no misstatement, then the plaintiff has to prove
both that a transaction or event was accounted for incorrectly, and that the
treatment was intentionally malevolent. The roadmap theory argues that “the detail
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and objectivity of rules‐based standards help to establish intent, as plaintiffs can
argue that it is implausible that executives would unintentionally violate the clear
guidance provide by a rules‐based standard” (Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler,
2012, p. 1254).
To test the various relationships between standard type and litigation, the
authors looked at lawsuits citing specific accounting standards from 1996‐2005,
many years before and after the Enron accounting scandal. Interestingly enough,
they found that neither the protection theory nor the roadmap theory held true in
full. Though there was a correlation between standard type and litigation incidence,
the type of standard had no statistically significant effect on litigation outcomes
(Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler, 2012). Regarding cases without a
restatement, they concluded that plaintiffs are less likely to allege violations of more
rules‐oriented standards. Regarding cases with a restatement, incidence of litigation
was less across the board, suggesting credence towards the safe harbor assumption.
In summary, the authors stated that “the protection theory predicts that plaintiffs
will tend to allege standards that are more principles‐based due to the safe harbor
protection provided by rules‐based standards when firms follow rules, as well as
plaintiffs’ ability to ‘second‐guess’ accounting decisions under principles‐based
standards” (Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler, 2012, p. 1273). As such, they
assert that a shift towards a more principles‐oriented set of standards would
weaken the, currently strong, safe harbor protection, providing plaintiffs with “a
wider menu of potential ‘judgment‐based’ allegations in cases not involving
admitted restatements” (Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler, 2012, p. 1273).
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Conclusion: Are filling the gaps in GAAP possible?
asdfasdfasdfasdfasdf
Though there is still some debate about the value of adopting a more
principles‐oriented US GAAP, the overwhelming sentiment in the academic
community is that the United States’ set of accounting standards have swung too far
towards the rules‐oriented side of the continuum. Though there are certainly
transactions and events that require some level of guidance, the FASB, facing
pressure politically and from industry, has created a highly rules‐oriented US GAAP
over time. There is currently a propensity towards more and more guidance and
bright‐line rules. Among the primary justifications for this tendency is that rules‐
oriented standards lead to more comparability, which ultimately improves the
quality of financial information. However, as discussed above, often these standards
lead to nothing more than surface comparability. Surface comparability can be
extremely problematic because it creates the perception that firm’s financial
statements are comparable. In reality, though, firms are structuring transactions
around guidance and bright‐line rules, causing them to alter their actual operations,
not just their accounting numbers.
A more principles‐oriented US GAAP would give managers the ability to more
faithfully represent their firm’s economic reality. Allowing managers to prepare
relevant, faithfully represented financial statements should lead to more decision
useful information. However, there are numerous factors that must be taken into
account when considering a transition away from rules‐oriented standards. First,
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there are many logistical hurdles that need to be jumped. As Samaila (2012) pointed
out, any transition would likely be very highly capital intensive. Implementation
challenges would range anywhere from staff training to US GAAP redesign or
replacement to consultancy fees regarding proper reclassifications. In addition to
restructuring costs, there would likely be increased legal fees. Though Donelson,
McInnis, and Mergenthaler (2012) found that standard type does not affect litigation
outcomes, they did suggest that principles‐oriented standards do lead to higher
incidences of litigation. The increased number of lawsuits could tangibly affect firms
financially, as often times firms reach settlements before suits ever make it court.
Another concern raised by Schipper (2003) revolved around the resources of the
SEC. She did not believe the SEC had adequate resources to devote to answering
registrant questions about acceptable interpretations or engage in detailed
discussions about registrant choices, which would surely increase with a move away
from rules‐oriented standards.
These challenges, though difficult to quantify financially, can be reasonably
estimated and accounted for from a cost‐benefit analysis standpoint. The larger
challenge, then, revolves around the issue of integrity. As discussed in numerous
sections, managers find creative ways to circumvent the current highly rules‐
oriented standards, and auditors do not always do enough to counteract this
creativity. Still, it would be imprudent to suggest that principles‐oriented standards
would prevent managers from participating in opportunistic behavior altogether.
However, though this solution would require more auditor liability and is not
necessarily a short‐term answer, Smith suggested that “Educators need to
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increasingly emphasize two values that have long been the mainstay of accountants’
reputation: integrity and professional skepticism” (Smith, 2003, p. 48). Aggressive,
unethical behavior by top management at Enron largely crippled the company’s
ability to function and prosper, and ineffective auditors perpetuated their behavior.
Managers can be incentivized to act in the interest of their firm or their own self‐
interest. As such, ethics in accounting are essential to producing financial
statements that encourage public confidence. Neither rules nor principles can
completely preclude malevolent mangers from reporting fraudulently, but the
interplay between managers and auditors can lead to more decision useful
information.
With bight‐line rules and guidance lifted and a move back towards the
principles of a standard, managers can attempt to present the most relevant
information possible. Though managers best know about the transactions and
events of their firm, they are also optimistic about their firm’s future. It is here
where auditors, bound by a strong code of professional ethics and skepticism, must
hold managers accountable. Rather than relying on a detailed set of rules, managers
and auditors should be allowed to arrive upon faithfully represented numbers. In a
rules‐oriented world, managers are able to hide behind bright‐lines in accounting
standards, and auditors are not incentivized enough to challenge their clients who
are technically in compliance. In a principles‐oriented world, conversely, managers’
optimism and auditors’ conservatism are allowed to interact and produce more
relevant, and hopefully, more reliable information. Stripped of the ability to point to
mere compliance with a rules‐oriented standard, managers would need sound
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reasoning for a certain accounting treatment, and auditors would be responsible for
approving that reasoning.
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